Myanmar (Burma): Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?

Both sides of the international debate on Myanmar need to rethink their policies and objectives. Sanctions have not forced the military to end the grip on power it has maintained since 1962; nor are more sanctions likely to in the future, as there is no chance of them being applied universally. The often limp policies of "engagement" adopted by Myanmar's neighbours have been no more effective. A new approach is required, bridging the gap between the opposing policies. The international community should maintain pressure by setting benchmarks for the progressive lifting of sanctions and new economic support; and it should also offer, unconditionally, a number of new forms of support, including humanitarian aid, designed to create a positive environment for change. But nothing at all should happen unless and until Aung San Suu Kyi is first released from custody and a serious dialogue begins with her National League for Democracy (NLD), both within and beyond the framework of the National Convention due to reconvene on 17 May.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All members of the international community should press for, as preconditions for any other policy change:

(a) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's complete release from any kind of custody; and

(b) the commencement of serious political and constitutional dialogue both within and beyond the National Convention framework.

2. If those preconditions are satisfied, all members of the international community, under the guidance of the UN Secretary-General, should adopt a policy approach which involves:

(a) rethinking basic objectives for Myanmar, balancing what is desirable against what is realistically achievable;

(b) setting benchmarks for political and constitutional change, and using them as both bases for lifting sanctions and incentives for economic development support; and

(c) creating a positive environment for change by support, without further conditions, for conflict prevention and resolution, institution-building, planning for economic development, and humanitarian aid for vulnerable groups.

3. Realistic objectives for Myanmar should include, in the first instance:

(a) immediate improvements in political conditions, including release of all political prisoners, and freedom of movement and association for all participants in the political process;

(b) progress toward a democratic constitution, opening the way for a broader inclusion of all political groups in government; and

(c) progress on economic and social change.

4. Benchmarks of the following kind should be developed by countries applying sanctions, in particular the U.S. and EU members, in consultation with and under the guidance of the UN Secretary-General, the achievement of which would guide the progressive lifting of such sanctions:

(a) release of all political prisoners;

(b) freedom of movement and association for all participants in the political and constitutional-reform process;

(c) full inclusion of the NLD and ethnic nationality groups in the constitutional reform process;

(d) commitment to a reasonable timetable for the conduct of, and achievement of outcomes in, that process;

(e) provision and implementation of legal guarantees of human rights;

(f) establishment of a transitional government;

(g) holding of properly conducted elections.

5. Such benchmarks should also be used as incentives, as political and constitutional progress is made, for benefits including:

(a) funding from the World Bank, the IMF and Asian Development Bank as the government implements economic policies that will create the environment for growth;

(b) assistance in particular for infrastructure and other development projects, including rehabilitation of power plants and other vital services; and

(c) access to European and U.S. markets for textiles and other manufactured goods.

6. Without further conditions, more international support should be given for conflict prevention and resolution within Myanmar, in particular by:

(a) Myanmar's neighbours continuing and increasing efforts to create an environment conducive to further ceasefire agreements and peace talks between the military government and the remaining insurgent groups;

(b) international donors expanding humanitarian assistance to ethnic minority areas and developing a long-term plan for post-conflict reconstruction in those areas; and

(c) international donors also providing further training and assistance to aid the participation of ethnic minorities in future constitutional negotiations.

7. Without further conditions, more international support should be given to institution-building within Myanmar, including by:

(a) Japan and the ASEAN countries renewing and increasing support for civil service reform and capacity-building at all levels of the state, including programs for local administrations in the special regions;

(b) the UN system commissioning a detailed report on the state of the independent sectors, which would examine the structure, capacity and activities of political parties, civil society organisations and private companies and develop baselines against which to measure their future growth and openness;

(c) the donor community developing on the basis of that report an in-country aid program specifically to train and support individuals working in key independent sectors, contingent on the degree of freedom from governmental control of each sector; and

(d) generally expanding the availability of overseas scholarships, study trips, and longer-term placements in international institutions for Myanmar nationals, targeting government officials as well as members of political parties, civil society organisations, and the next generation of leaders and administrators.

8. Without further conditions, more international support should be given for planning for economic development, in particular by:

(a) international donors establishing a Myanmar Aid Group and appointing a prominent economic envoy or interlocutor to play a role similar to that of Razali Ismail and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro in the political and human rights realms respectively;

(b) encouraging the international financial institutions (IFIs) to establish local offices in Yangon to facilitate policy dialogue and broader consultation with relevant groups and expand their knowledge base; and

(c) modifying the UNDP's special mandate to allow the UN Country Team as a whole to engage in policy dialogue with the government, as well as selective capacity-building in the social and other poverty-related sectors, and allow the UN to provide assistance to a larger share of the population.

9. Without further conditions, more international humanitarian aid should be made available to vulnerable groups, in particular by aid agencies and international organisations:

(a) using increased humanitarian aid as an entry point for dialogue with the military government on the causes of systemic vulnerabilities;

(b) working, as far as possible, to draw different sides in the political, economic, social and religious conflicts into joint planning and execution of assistance projects;

(c) establishing two joint task forces to address food security and basic education, as well as an overarching project on reconstruction of war-torn communities and economies in the border areas;

(d) expanding International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) efforts to protect civilian populations in heavily militarised and conflict-affected areas;

(e) implementing the International Labour Organization (ILO) May 2003 agreement with the Myanmar government on an action plan to eliminate forced labour, emphasising the new mechanism for facilitating action by victims of forced labour; and

(f) resuming human rights training programs with a new emphasis on army personnel and the institutions where they are working.

10. The UN Secretary-General should:

(a) upgrade the present UN envoy role by appointing a Special Representative with a broader, more pro-active mandate;

(b) develop, with the advice and assistance of the Special Representative, a credible plan for international engagement in the roadmap process, taking into account the objectives and benchmarks proposed in this report; and

(c) visit Myanmar to impress personally upon the military leadership the importance the UN attaches to the national reconciliation process.

11. ASEAN and its member states should:

(a) press the Myanmar government for a commitment to finalise the constitution and hold free and fair elections before its ASEAN presidency in 2006;

(b) offer appropriate assistance to ensure effective and timely implementation of specific commitments; and

(c) make clear that consideration would have to be given to altering the presidency arrangements for 2006 in the absence of major progress toward the achievement of the agreed benchmarks.

12. China, India and other neighbours of Myanmar should state clearly their support for UN efforts to promote national reconciliation and use their influence to persuade the military government to recognise the urgent need for substantial political and economic reform.

Yangon/Brussels, 26 April 2004
ICG